Europe Can No Longer Afford to Outsource Its Independence to America
From military security and digital infrastructure to Ukraine and the war involving Iran, the transatlantic relationship is exposing a question Europe can no longer postpone: what happens when the country on which you depend becomes a source of uncertainty itself?
For generations, the relationship between the United States and Europe has been presented as the cornerstone of the Western world. America provided military protection, nuclear deterrence, technological innovation and diplomatic influence. Europe, in return, remained part of a powerful political and economic alliance that helped shape the post-war international order.
That partnership delivered enormous benefits. It helped anchor Western European security during the Cold War, supported the reconstruction of the continent and provided the framework within which NATO expanded and European economies prospered.
But an alliance that worked under one set of political circumstances cannot simply be assumed to work indefinitely under another.
The central question facing Britain and Europe is no longer whether America has been a valuable ally. It has. The question is whether European security, prosperity and democratic freedom should continue to depend so heavily on decisions made in Washington, particularly when American foreign policy can change sharply between administrations.
The case for European strategic independence is no longer an abstract ambition entertained by a handful of politicians in Brussels or Paris. It is a practical debate about military preparedness, economic resilience, technological control and the ability of European democracies to make sovereign decisions.
Independence does not mean abandoning America. It means ensuring that Europe has choices when America chooses differently.
1. An alliance cannot substitute for self-reliance
The uncomfortable reality is that Europe has allowed critical elements of its security to depend on American capabilities.
The United States supplies military assets that European countries cannot yet replace quickly or comprehensively. These include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, strategic airlift, aerial refuelling, battlefield command systems and important long-range strike capabilities.
The European Parliament’s research service documented these dependencies in its October 2026 briefing on EU–US defence cooperation. It also identified renewed uncertainty over American alliance policy and the continuing imbalance between Europe’s defence industries and those of the United States.
These are not minor gaps that can be filled overnight. They are capabilities that take years of investment, technical development and industrial cooperation to build.
The problem is not that America possesses these capabilities. The problem is what happens if access to them is delayed, restricted or withdrawn when European interests do not align with American priorities.
A country that cannot adequately defend itself without another country’s assistance does not enjoy complete strategic freedom. Its leaders must consider not only what their citizens need, but also what their principal security provider is willing to permit, support or sustain.
This is not an argument for dismantling NATO. It is an argument for making Europe’s contribution to NATO substantial enough that European security does not collapse if Washington changes direction.
Indeed, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued in September 2026 that European countries should develop defence capabilities that could operate independently if the United States were unwilling or unable to participate in a European conflict, while retaining the wider NATO framework.
The distinction matters. Europe does not need to become America’s adversary. It needs to become less vulnerable to America’s decisions.
2. NATO is only as reassuring as the political commitment behind it
NATO remains indispensable to European security. Its collective-defence principle, enshrined in Article 5, is intended to deter an attack on one member by making clear that an attack on one will be treated as a matter for all.
For decades, the credibility of that commitment has rested heavily on the assumption that the United States would be prepared to defend its European allies with overwhelming military power.
Yet the political foundation of an alliance matters as much as its treaty language.
During Donald Trump’s second presidency, uncertainty about the American commitment to NATO has become a recurring feature of transatlantic relations. Washington has pressed European allies to spend more on defence, questioned the distribution of responsibilities and generated anxiety through threats and disagreements involving NATO members.
The 2026 NATO summit in Ankara reaffirmed the allies’ commitment to Article 5. That is significant. But reaffirming a guarantee does not remove the underlying question of how consistently it will be supported by future American administrations.
European governments cannot know with certainty what a future American president will decide during a crisis. Nor should they assume that every future administration will approach NATO in the same way.
This is the central weakness of excessive dependence on a single ally: the security of an entire continent becomes exposed to political changes over which its citizens have no vote.
Britain, France, Germany, Poland and other European countries have their own electoral mandates, security interests and responsibilities. They should not have to discover, in the middle of an international emergency, whether their combined capabilities are sufficient to protect their populations.
NATO should remain a foundation of collective defence. It should not become an excuse for postponing the development of European defence capacity.
3. Ukraine: When America’s Support Becomes a Strategic Liability
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated why European security cannot be taken for granted. But the events of October 2026 have exposed a further danger: Ukraine’s ability to defend itself can be affected not only by Russian military action, but also by political decisions made in Washington.
The latest deterioration in relations between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy should concern every European government.
On 15 October, Reuters reported that an order to limit Ukraine’s access to Starshield, a satellite communications service controlled by the US government, had originated inside the White House, according to officials briefed on the matter. Ukrainian forces rely on satellite connectivity for battlefield communications and certain drone operations. Restrictions on the service disrupted missions and complicated efforts to defend against Russian attacks.
The controversy became more complicated when Elon Musk acknowledged on 25 October that SpaceX had separately imposed restrictions on commercial Starlink access, arguing that Ukraine had breached the service’s terms by using it for offensive drone strikes. Starlink and Starshield are distinct systems, and the precise responsibility for the government-controlled Starshield restrictions remains disputed. Nevertheless, the episode has demonstrated how access to critical battlefield technology can become a source of uncertainty during a war.
For Ukraine, this is not a theoretical debate about technological sovereignty. Satellite connectivity can determine whether a drone maintains its connection, whether military units can communicate and whether a defensive operation can be coordinated effectively. When essential infrastructure is controlled by an external government or company, the country using it cannot assume that access will always remain unchanged.
And the satellite controversy is only part of the story.
In October, Trump intensified pressure on Kyiv to stop attacking Russian oil refineries, while his administration moved to ease certain restrictions on Russian fuel sales. Ukrainian officials have argued that their long-range drone strikes are a legitimate response to Russia’s continuing bombardment of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Washington, meanwhile, has sought to restrain those attacks, citing concerns including energy prices and the prospects for negotiations.
Reuters reported on 19 October that Zelenskyy had complained about delays to weapons deliveries, limitations on intelligence sharing and the absence of advance warnings of Russian attacks on several occasions. The following day, Zelenskyy said that US intelligence sharing had been restored, particularly information used to warn of incoming ballistic missile attacks. These developments underline both the value of American assistance and the uncertainty surrounding its availability.
The diplomatic relationship has deteriorated alongside these military disputes. Trump has criticised Zelenskyy’s leadership, suggested that Ukraine should find a different leader to negotiate an end to the war and pursued arrangements with Moscow that have raised concerns among Ukrainian officials and some American lawmakers. His administration’s approach has become more accommodating towards Russia on some issues, even as Moscow continues its war against Ukraine.
It would be premature to conclude that Trump and Vladimir Putin have reached an understanding at Europe’s expense. The facts, however, support a more immediate concern: American policy is placing increasing pressure on Kyiv, while the administration’s willingness to maintain pressure on Moscow has become less predictable.
That distinction matters enormously to Europe.
Ukraine is not a distant conflict with no bearing on European life. Its outcome will influence the credibility of European deterrence, the security of NATO’s eastern members and the future willingness of other governments to use military force to change borders. European countries have a direct interest in ensuring that any peace agreement is durable, that Ukraine can defend itself and that Russia cannot simply rebuild its forces and resume the war on more favourable terms.
Yet Europe still depends on American intelligence, air-defence systems, satellite infrastructure and other military capabilities that cannot all be replaced quickly. This leaves European governments exposed when Washington’s policy diverges from their own assessment of the threat.
The lesson is not that America has never supported Ukraine, or that European governments should cease cooperating with Washington. American assistance has been important to Ukraine’s resistance, and the restoration of intelligence sharing illustrates that policy can change again. The lesson is that a country’s survival should not depend on the shifting preferences of a foreign administration.
Europe must therefore develop the ability to sustain Ukraine’s defence, provide reliable intelligence and communications, expand weapons production and protect its own territory without assuming that every essential American capability will always be available.
This requires more than declarations of solidarity. It requires investment, common procurement, secure European communications infrastructure, stronger air and missile defence and a coordinated strategy for supporting Ukraine over the long term.
There is an uncomfortable irony here. European governments have spent decades treating the American security guarantee as the ultimate insurance policy. The Ukraine war is now demonstrating that insurance is not the same as control: the provider retains the power to determine the terms on which support is delivered.
Europe’s security cannot rest on the assumption that Washington will always share Europe’s priorities. It must rest on Europe’s ability to protect its own interests when those priorities diverge.
That is not an argument for abandoning NATO. It is an argument for making the European members of NATO capable of acting decisively within the alliance and, when necessary, without waiting for permission or assistance from Washington.
The future of Ukraine is one of the clearest reasons why Europe can no longer postpone that task.
4. The war involving Iran raises a fundamental question of European sovereignty
The conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran has brought another dimension of transatlantic dependence into focus.
The United States and Israel initiated hostilities against Iran on 28 February 2026. The resulting conflict has exposed differences between Washington and European governments over the use of military force, the responsibilities of allies and the consequences of a wider regional war.
European governments have had to confront a difficult distinction: supporting an ally’s security is not the same as automatically supporting every military operation that ally undertakes.
NATO is a defensive alliance, not a general authorisation for every member to participate in every war initiated by another member. Article 5 concerns collective defence following an armed attack; it does not create a blanket obligation to join a discretionary military campaign outside the alliance’s collective-defence remit.
That distinction matters because the consequences of a Middle Eastern war do not stop at the region’s borders.
Disruption to energy supplies and shipping routes can raise costs for European households and businesses. Wider instability can create new security pressures, complicate diplomacy and place additional demands on already stretched military resources.
Europe therefore has legitimate interests in the Middle East, but those interests do not always coincide with Washington’s chosen methods.
If European governments oppose a particular military operation, they need sufficient diplomatic influence, intelligence capacity and defence resilience to make that position meaningful. If they support a particular objective, they should have the ability to contribute on terms determined by their own national interests and legal obligations.
The issue is not whether Europe should reflexively oppose American action. It is whether European governments can make independent judgements without being forced into a position by their reliance on American military assets or by fear of the consequences of disagreement.
A genuine alliance allows disagreement. A healthy partnership does not require political obedience.
5. Europe is dependent on America in the digital world as well
Military dependence is only one part of the problem. Europe also relies heavily on technology supplied by companies headquartered outside the continent, particularly in the United States.
Cloud computing, operating systems, enterprise software, artificial intelligence infrastructure, semiconductor technology and digital platforms are now integral to public administration, financial services, healthcare, communications and national security.
The European Commission’s June 2026 communication on technological sovereignty stated that the EU remained structurally reliant on non-EU providers for more than 80% of its digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property. The Commission also highlighted dependencies involving cloud services, advanced semiconductors, AI hardware and other essential digital infrastructure.
This dependence has commercial benefits. American technology companies have developed products and services that European businesses and governments use because they are effective, scalable and widely supported.
The concern is not that foreign technology is inherently undesirable. It is that excessive concentration can leave European institutions with too few alternatives.
Consider the implications of a government, hospital, financial institution or major manufacturer depending on a small number of foreign providers for essential digital services. Changing suppliers can be costly, technically difficult and disruptive. Data access, software licensing, cybersecurity and the legal jurisdiction of providers can become matters of strategic importance.
The issue is not hypothetical in the broader sense. The European Commission has explicitly warned about vendor lock-in, the concentration of digital infrastructure and the risks created by dependencies in critical sectors.
Nor is technological sovereignty a demand that every European country manufacture every chip or develop every software application itself. That would be unrealistic and economically wasteful.
The objective should be to ensure that Europe has competitive alternatives in critical areas, owns or controls essential infrastructure where necessary, develops its own technological expertise and avoids becoming trapped in systems it cannot replace.
Europe needs more capacity in cloud computing, AI, semiconductor design and production, cybersecurity and open-source software. It also needs procurement rules that make it easier for European providers to compete and for public institutions to move between suppliers.
Digital independence is not simply an industrial policy. It is part of national security.
A continent that cannot reliably control or replace essential elements of its digital infrastructure has left an important part of its economic future dependent on decisions made elsewhere.
6. Economic strength without strategic control is an incomplete form of power
Europe remains a major economic force. Its combined markets, skilled workforce, scientific institutions, manufacturing capacity and regulatory influence give it substantial international weight.
Yet economic size does not automatically translate into geopolitical independence.
If European countries depend on external suppliers for essential defence equipment, advanced computing, energy technologies and other strategic goods, their ability to respond to international pressure may be constrained.
That vulnerability can work in several directions. Supply disruptions can affect production. Restrictions on technology exports can delay industrial development. Dependence on a limited number of suppliers can reduce bargaining power. And the cost of replacing an established supplier during a crisis can be much higher than the cost of preparing alternatives in advance.
The appropriate response is not economic isolationism. Europe benefits from trade, foreign investment and international scientific cooperation. It would be counterproductive to replace excessive dependence on America with excessive dependence on China or any other single country.
Instead, European governments need a policy of diversification: stronger domestic capabilities where they are strategically necessary, multiple suppliers where possible, and partnerships that do not leave essential national functions vulnerable to the decisions of one external power.
This is particularly important for Britain.
Brexit changed the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union, but it did not eliminate Britain’s dependence on American defence technology, intelligence cooperation or digital infrastructure. Nor did it remove the UK’s exposure to energy shocks, international conflict or changes in Washington’s foreign policy.
British independence cannot mean merely transferring decisions from Brussels to London while continuing to rely on external powers for critical capabilities.
Britain’s geographic position, financial institutions, scientific expertise and defence industry give it potential to play a significant role in a stronger European security architecture. Cooperation with France, Germany, Poland and other European partners could strengthen Britain’s influence while preserving its sovereignty.
The practical question is whether Britain and its European neighbours are prepared to organise their resources around common strategic needs rather than allowing institutional disagreements to undermine their collective capacity.
7. Independence requires investment, not just rhetoric
There is a danger that strategic autonomy becomes another political slogan: attractive in speeches, difficult in practice.
Europe cannot simply announce its independence and expect the necessary capabilities to appear.
Defence manufacturing requires long-term contracts, skilled workers, research investment and predictable demand. Advanced semiconductor production requires enormous capital expenditure and specialised expertise. Secure cloud infrastructure requires data centres, energy supplies, networks and cybersecurity professionals. Effective collective defence requires interoperability, common planning and political trust.
There are also genuine disagreements between European countries. Governments may prefer to protect national industries, maintain different weapons systems or retain control over sensitive decisions. The collapse of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System project in 2026 illustrates how industrial rivalry can obstruct ambitions for shared defence capabilities.
These difficulties should not be minimised. They are reasons to plan more carefully, not reasons to abandon the objective.
A credible European strategy would involve:
- Defence: Build the capacity to defend European territory, sustain military operations and replace critical American capabilities over time.
- NATO: Retain the alliance while ensuring European members can take greater responsibility for their own conventional defence.
- Technology: Develop competitive European alternatives in cloud computing, AI, semiconductors, cybersecurity and essential digital services.
- Industry: Coordinate procurement and establish long-term demand so that European manufacturers can invest with confidence.
- Energy and infrastructure: Diversify critical supplies and strengthen the resilience of transport, communications and energy networks.
- Diplomacy: Develop a more coordinated European voice on Ukraine, the Middle East and other international crises, while recognising legitimate differences between national governments.
None of this can be achieved cheaply or immediately. Defence budgets compete with healthcare, education, pensions and other public priorities. European governments will need to explain the costs, establish clear priorities and demonstrate that spending produces useful capabilities rather than simply subsidising fragmented national industries.
The goal is not autarky. It is resilience: the ability to withstand pressure, respond to crises and make decisions without a critical dependency becoming a veto on national policy.
8. A stronger Europe could make the transatlantic alliance more sustainable
There is an important counterargument to the case for European strategic autonomy. American military power remains central to NATO, and the United States provides capabilities that Europe will find difficult to reproduce in the near future. Intelligence sharing, nuclear deterrence and operational cooperation remain important to European security.
A sudden attempt to sever these ties would be dangerous. It could create gaps in defence, waste resources and undermine the very security that European governments are seeking to protect.
But that is not the only alternative to dependence.
Europe can strengthen its own capabilities while maintaining cooperation with the United States. It can develop European defence production without excluding American suppliers. It can build secure digital alternatives without rejecting useful foreign technology. It can disagree with Washington on a particular war while continuing to cooperate on areas of shared interest.
Indeed, greater European capacity could benefit the alliance itself. An ally that can shoulder more responsibility is better placed to contribute during a crisis, support collective deterrence and sustain commitments when another member is distracted by events elsewhere.
The United States also has its own reasons to welcome a Europe capable of doing more for its own security. Washington faces global strategic demands, including competition with China. European governments should not assume that American resources will always be available in the quantities or at the times they would prefer.
The most sustainable transatlantic relationship may therefore be one in which Europe is a capable partner rather than a dependent customer.
That arrangement would require changes on both sides. European governments would need to spend more effectively, coordinate their policies and accept greater responsibility. American administrations would need to recognise that European strategic capacity is not necessarily a threat to American influence.
An alliance based on mutual capability is more likely to withstand political disagreements than one sustained by habit and assumptions about permanent dependence.
The real question is whether Europe is prepared to take responsibility for its future
Europe’s relationship with America is too important to be reduced to a simple choice between loyalty and hostility.
The United States has been a crucial ally. Its military contribution to European security, its support for Ukraine and its technological achievements cannot be dismissed. Nor can European governments ignore the serious challenges involved in building independent capabilities.
But history does not guarantee the future. Political leadership changes. National priorities shift. Wars create new pressures. Technology becomes a source of geopolitical leverage. And the interests of allies, however closely aligned, are not always identical.
The experience of Ukraine, the disagreements over the war involving Iran, uncertainty surrounding NATO and Europe’s dependence on external digital infrastructure all point towards the same strategic question: how much control should European societies retain over the systems on which their security and prosperity depend?
The answer need not be a break with America. It can be a more balanced relationship in which cooperation is a choice supported by capability, rather than a necessity imposed by vulnerability.
For Britain and Europe, the challenge is to build the military, industrial, technological and diplomatic strength required to protect their interests even when their closest ally makes different choices.
That means investing before a crisis, not scrambling after one. It means replacing fragmented national ambitions with practical cooperation. And it means accepting that sovereignty is not merely the formal right to make decisions; it is also the capacity to carry them out.
Europe does not need to turn against America to stand on its own feet. It needs to ensure that its future is not dependent on the goodwill, priorities or political fortunes of any single foreign power.
That is not a rejection of the transatlantic alliance. It is a case for making Europe strong enough to sustain one.
